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Abstract. From a declarative programming point of view, Manna and Shamir's optimal fixedpoint 
semantics i more appealing than the least fixedpoint semantics. However in standard formalisms 
of recursive programming the optimal fixedpoint is not computable while the least fixedpoint is. 
In the context of logic programming we show that the optimal fixedpoint is equal to the least 
fixedpoint and is computable. Furthermore the optimal fixedpoint semantics i consistent with 
Van Emden and Kowalski's emantics of logic programs. 
Introduction 
Manna and Shamir, in a series of papers [12, 13, 14], have argued that the 'natural' 
solution (that is, the one intended by the programmer) can be formalized as a 
fixedpoint called the optimal fixedpoint, which is different in general from the least 
fixedpoint. However the optimal fixedpoint is not computable in the standard 
formalisms of recursive definitions while the least fixedpoint is. We show in this 
paper that the optimal fixedpoint and the least fixedpoint semantics coincide for 
logic programs. 
This result is a further evidence that the mathematical theory of fixedpoints is a 
particularly good tool to describe semantic properties of logic programs. Indeed 
Van Emden and Kowalsgi introduced least fixedpoint semantics [3]. Apt and 
Van Emden extended their results and introduced greatest fixedpoint semantics for 
finite failure and negation [I]. Further results along these lines may be found in 
Blair [2] and Jaffar, Lassez and Maher [4]. Finally Lassez and Maher introduced 
common fixedpoint semantics and further fixedpoint theorems to relate the semantics 
of the programs to the semantics of the rules [7, 8]. In turn, the fact that logic 
programs are so amenable to rigorous descriptions using simple algebraic tools, 
which do not apply so nicely to conventional programming, is further evidence that 
logic programming is a good formalism. An extended treatment of these issues will 
be found in [9]. 
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In any model A and B will be assigned true, which is consistent with the informal 
semantics. C may be assigned arbitrarily true or false. Not enough information is 
provided for us to be able to decide which truth value should be assigned to C. In 
other words, in the informal semantics the truth value for C is undefined. Therefore 
we have a motivation to consider partial models, that is partially defined assignments 
of truth values, as is done in denotational semantics where often undefined corre- 
sponds to an infinite computation. This approach is taken by Mycroft [15] where 
a three-valued logic is used to recast some known results in a more uniform 
framework. He also characterizes the behaviour of depth-first search by using a 
5-valued logic. Here undefined will correspond to not provable, from an operational 
point of view, and to inconsistent (true in one model, false in another) from a 
declarative point of view. This, together with a recursive definition for models, will 
lead to a mathematical framework in which we can apply Manna and Shamir's 
results, that we review in the next section. 
Then we present briefly the syntax of logic programs (that is definite Horn clauses). 
The reader will find a complete treatment in Kowalski [6]. We then extend the truth 
tables of various connectives to include the undefined element, and define our notion 
of model. As in the classical fixedpoint heory [11] we have 'strong' and 'weak' 
possible versions for the definitions. The classical results on Herbrand models are 
easily extended. In the following section we give an equivalent definition of models 
as fixedpoints of an operator. We show that its optimal fixedpoint corresponds to 
the weak semantics of logical consequence while its least fixedpoint corresponds to 
the strong semantics of logical consequence. We prove then a series of theorems 
which state that the optimal fixedpoint is equal to the least fixedpoint, that this 
fixedpoint is reached in to steps even though the operator is not continuous, and 
finally that this semantics is equivalent to the Van Emden-Kowalski semantics. 
1. Optimal fixedpoint semantics 
Manna and Shamir have attempted to formalize the notion of 'natural' solution 
of a recursive definition. They gave two independent criteria, one based on the use 
of information provided by the equation and one based on consistency. They then 
derived two corresponding formal definitions (based on existence theorems) and 
have proved that they lead to the same solution. For that reason, they have called 
this solution the optimalfixedpoint. We sketch their motivations and give the relevant 
results. An informal presentation is given in [13], a wealth of examples in [14] and 
a formal presentation i [12]. _L represents an undefined value. We use a definedness 
ordering on partial functions: 
fE  g iff Vx : f (x)  = _1_ or f (x )  = g(x). 
It is claimed that a fixedpoint g uses more information from the equation than a 
fixedpoint f when f _  g. Consequently the greatest fixedpoint, when it exists, would 
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be, according to that criterion, the best solution. As the greatest fixedpoint does not 
always exist, it is the greatest lower bound (in the poset of fixedpoints) of the set 
of maximal fixedpoints which is chosen. The following theorem guarantees its 
existence. 
Theorem 1.1. The set of fixedpoints that are less defined than all maximal fixedpoints 
has a greatest element. 
The other criterion is based on the two following definitions. 
Definition 1.2. Two functions are said to be consistent if they have identical values 
for any argument for which both are defined. 
Definition 1.3. A fixedpoint of a program P is fxp-consistent if it is consistent with 
every fixedpoint of P. 
Manna and Shamir consider the fxp-consistent fixedpoints as the only genuine 
solutions of a recursive quation, since the values given by other solutions are not 
uniquely determined by the equation. It is again argued that a more defined solution 
is preferable. By this criterion, the chosen solution is the greatest fxp-consistent 
fixedpoint, whose existence is established by the following theorem. 
Theorem 1.4. The set of all fxp-consistent fixedpoints has a greatest element. 
The next theorem shows that the fixedpoints defined in the previous two theorems 
are identical. For this reason, this fixedpoint is called the optimalfixedpoint. 
Theorem 1.5. The greatest fxp-consistent fixedpoint is the greatest fixedpoint less defined 
than all maximal fixedpoints. 
There is, however, a severe restriction in considering the optimal fixedpoint: in 
general, it is not computable. In [2], Manna and Shamir discuss ways of obtaining 
the optimal fixedpoint when it is computable, and switching to the least fixedpoint 
otherwise. Maybe instead we should look for formalisms of recursive definitions 
such that the optimal fixedpoint is equal to the least fixedpoint. 
2. Syntax of logic programs 
Before dealing with the semantics of logic programs we must first define their 
syntax. We begin with a set V of variables, sets Fn (n = 0, 1, 2, . . . )  of n-ary function 
symbols, and sets Pn (n = 0, 1, 2, . . . )  of n-ary predicate symbols. We assume that 
all of these sets are disjoint. The set of terms is defined inductively: 
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(a) A variable is a term. 
(b) I f f~  F~ and t l , . . . ,  tn are terms then f (h , . . . ,  tn) is a term (in particular if 
fe  Fo, then f is a term). 
An atomic formula (atom) is of the form Q(t~,...,  tn) where Qe Pn and t~, . . . ,  t. 
are terms (if Q ~ Po, then Q is an atom). 
A clause takes the form 
VX1,. . .  , VXp (A  1 V A2  V"  • " V An) <-- (B1  A"  " " A Bin) 
where A~, . . . ,  An and B~, . . . ,  Bm are atoms and x~, . . . ,  xp are the distinct variables 
which occur in these atoms. However clauses are generally written in a simpler form: 
A1, . . . ,A~ <-- B1, . . . ,Bm.  
The disjunction of atoms to the left of the <- is called the head of the clause and 
the. conjunction of atoms on the right is called the body of the clause. We will 
restrict our attention to clauses where n <~ 1, called Horn clauses. Horn clauses are 
divided into two classes: the negative clauses (when n = 0) and the definite clauses 
(when n --- 1). 
A logic program is a conjunction C~ ^ - • • A Cq of definite clauses Ci (i = 1 , . . . ,  q). 
Those terms, atoms, literals or clauses containing no variables are described as 
ground terms, atoms, etc. The set of all ground terms is called the Herbrand universe 
HU and the set of all ground atoms is the Herbrand base HB. 
3. Models of logic programs 
We now extend various definitions and results to cater for the undefined element 
_L, which becomes a new truth value in a three-valued logic. (Whether we are defining 
a partially defined two-valued logic or a three-valued one is debatable). 
An interpretation I of a program co.nsists of a universe U, an assignment tr of an 
n-ary function f :  U n ~ U to each n-ary function symbol f and a function ~b which 
maps each n-ary predicate symbol and element of U n to a truth value. The first 
function can be extended to an evaluation ]Function p for ground terms 
p( f ( t l , . . . ,  tn))=tr( f ) (p(t l ) , . . . ,  p(t~)). 
Combining the truth function 0 and the evaluation function p we obtain a new 
function ~ : HB --> (true, false, _L) which is defined by 
~,( P(  t l ,  . . . , tn) ) - - -  d/( P, p (  t , ) ,  . . . , p ( t . ) ) .  
We will often, in an abuse of terminology, refer to ~'~ as an interpretation. Two 
interpretations I and J are said to be equivalent iff st1 = srj. A Herbrand interpretation 
is an interpretation where the universe is the Herbrand universe and the evaluation 
function is the identity function. It is clear that every interpretation I has an 
equivalent Herbrand interpretation H by taking OH such that d/H(P, t~,..., tn)= 
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(P ( t l , .  • •, t,)). Thus each equivalence class contains one (and only one) Herbrand 
interpretation. A valuat ion v for an interpretation I is a function v: V -  U which 
gives each variable a value in the universe U of L For any v we can extend ~'~ to 
a function Ct, v which gives a truth value to all terms. 
As a result of adding an extra truth value we no longer have the identity of 'true' 
and 'not false', and so we now have the choice of two different definitions of the 
models of a program: (strong models) those interpretations under which the program 
evaluates to true and (weak models) those interpretations under which the program 
does not evaluate to false. However to evaluate a program we first need a logic. 
The semantics we give logic programs will depend on the logic which we choose 
and our choice of strong or weak models. To ensure that we obtain an appropriate 
semantics we must make our choices with the informal semantics in mind. The truth 
table for A (Fig. 1) is the regular extension (in the sense of Kleene [5]) of its 
Boolean logic counterpart.  
Q 
P ^ Q true false J_ 
true true false 3_ 
P false false false false 
3- 3_ false 3_ 
Fig. 1. Truth table for a. 
This extension is intuitively appealing if we remember that _L represents an 
uncertain true/false value. In particular notice that A remains associative and 
commutative, so the meaning of a clause is not ambiguous and the order of atoms 
in the body of a clause is irrelevant. However to choose the truth table for --> it 
may help to examine an example. 
If we have the simple program 
A~A;  
then our informal semantics tells us that whether an interpretation gives the truth 
value of  A as true or false, this interpretation is a model. I f  the truth value of A is 
uncertain then we might expect this also to be a model since both possible values 
have been allowed in models. Essentially this argument is for regularity [5] in the 
extension on the leading diagonal Of the truth table and the resulting truth table 
(Fig. 2(a)) is exactly that of Lukasiewicz [10] and defines Post's c".~ in the case 
when/z  = 1 and m =3 [16]. 
The final logical symbol is V. Vx:C  is true under an interpretation I and a 
valuation v if, for every element a of the universe of I, C is true under ! and v' 
where v' is the valuat ion which agrees with v except at x where v ' (x )  = a. Vx  : C is 
false under an interpretation I and a valuation v if, for some element a of the 
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universe o f / ,  C is false under  I and v' where v' is the valuation which agrees with 
v except at x where v'(x) = a. Otherwise, Vx : C is ±. It is clear that when a formula 
has no free variables its truth value depends only on L 
Q Q 
P --> Q true fa lse ± P--> Q true false 1 
true true fa lse ± true true false false 
P false true true true P false true true true 
z true 3_ true z true false z 
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2. (a). Implication for strong models. (b). Implication for weak models. 
The semantics of --> combined with the strong definition of model (and the 
semantics of the other logical symbols), defines a class of interpretations a  the 
models of P. The same class can be defined independently in a number of different 
ways (for example, using the weak definition of models and a different semantics 
for --> (Fig. 2(b))). We will choose to deal with the strong models and the semantics 
for --> described in Fig. 2(a). Similar results can be obtained in the other framework. 
Thus we arrive at the following definition of model: 
An interpretation I is a model of a program P iff P evaluates to true under I, i.e. 
for every clause A ~ B~, . . . ,  Bn in P and every valuation v either ~x.o(A) = true or 
3j; l<~j<~n: ~I,~(Bj) =fa lse  or ~l,v(A) =_1_ and =lj; l<~j<~n: srl, v(Bj) = ±. 
We say a ground atom A is true (false, 3-) under an interpretation I if[ ~i(A) = true 
(respectively false, Z). 
We are able to show that the Herbrand interpretations are fully representative of 
all interpretations with regard to the existence of models. 
Theorem 3.1. I f  P has a strong (weak) model, then P has an equivalent strong (weak) 
Herbrand model. 
Proof. The proof  follows similar lines to the proof  of the corresponding result in 
the standard two-valued logic. [] 
4. Fixedpoint semantics o f  logic programs 
We place the following partial order on the set of truth values which could be 
seen as an order of definedness: ± E true, 3_ _m_ false, false E false, true E true and 3_ E ±. 





This partial order induces an ordering of interpretations. If f and g are interpreta- 
tions, then 
fEg  iff f (A )Eg(A)  (VA~HB) .  
A set with a partial ordering is called a partially ordered set (poset). Thus the set of 
all interpretations is a poset. With an ordering comes the concepts of  upper and 
lower bound. The greatest lower bound of a subset S (glb S) of a poset X is an 
element x of X such that 
(a) x E y (Vy ~ S) (it is a lower bound),  and 
(b) if z E y (Vy e S) then z E x (it is the greatest). 
The least upper bound (lub) is defined similarly. The poset T = {true, false, 2_) and 
the poset of interpretations I have the property that every increasing sequence has 
a least upper bound and every subset has a greatest lower bound. They are domains 
in the sense of  Manna and Shamir [12]. 
Strictly speaking, for each such poset X we should use E x, lubx, glbx, . . .  since 
each ordering is different. However we will drop the use of this subscript and use 
the same symbol in each poset, except for when the poset in question is not obvious 
from the context. 
We now give a recursive characterization of models of a program P. We use 
f (exp)  to denote the truth value taken by the conjunction exp under the interpretation 
f. For a particular interpretation f and some ground atom A: 
If  there is a clause in P which has an instance A~ exp and f (exp)= true, 
then f (A)  must equal true i f f  is to be a model of P (by reading the first row 
of ~ truth table). 
Alternatively if every instance of every clause in P either does not have A 
at the head or is A ~ exp and f (exp)= false then, whatever value f (A)  has, it 
is satisfactory (by second row). 
I f  neither of the above cases apply then there is an  instance of a clause 
A ~- exp where f (exp)  = 2-. In this case we can choose f(A) to be either true or 
2- (by third row). 
We can write the recursive definition used to define models more formally as the 
functional ~" which acts on interpretations (i.e. functions f :  HB~{true,  false, _L}) 
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where 
true if there is a ground instance of a clause 
of P of the form A~- B1 , . . . ,  B, and 
f(Bi) = true (Vi, 1 ~< i ~< n). (1) 
glb{true, f (A)} if the first case does not hold and there 
r(f)(A) = is a ground instance of a clause in P 
of the form A~-B1,... ,B, with 
f(Bi) ~ false (Vi, 1 ~< i ~< n). (2) 
f(A) if for every ground instance of a clause 
in P of the form A<--Bb...,B, 
f(Bj) = false for some j, 1 ~<j ~< n. (3) 
The three cases are numbered for future reference. We must first verify that the 
fixedpoints of r are indeed exactly the models. 
Theorem 4.1. f is a model iff r(f)=f. 
Proof. f is a model iff for every ground instance A ~- B~, . . . ,  B, of a clause in P: 
(a) If f (B i )  = true (Vi, 1 <~ i <~ n), then f(A) = true and 
(b) I f f (B , )  ~ false (Vi, 1 <~ i~ < n) and 3j:f(Bj) -- ±, then f (A )  =true or f (A )  = _1_. 
Now suppose f is a model and let A e HB. If  (1) holds fo r f  then r(f)(A) = true. 
But by (a) f (A )=t rue  so r(f)(A)=f(A). I f  (2) holds for f, then r(f)(A)= 
glb{true, f(A)}=f(A) by (b). If (3) holds for f, then z(f)(A)=f(A). Thus r(f)(A)= 
f(A) (VA ~ Ha) ,  that is, z(f)=f. 
Suppose r(f) =f  and let A ~ Bb . . . ,  B, be a ground instance of some clause in 
P. If f(Bi)=true(Vi, l~i<-n), then r(f)(A)=true and so f (A )=true  and this 
ground instance evaluates to true. I f  f(Bi) ~ false (Vi, 1 <~ i ~ n) and 3j :  f(Bj) = Z 
then either (1) or (2) holds for A and f. So either f(A) = r(f)(A) = true or f(A)= 
r(f)(A) = glb{true, f(A)}, i.e. f(A) =true or &. Since A~- B1 , . . . ,  B, was arbitrary, 
(a) and (b) hold for all ground instances of clauses in P and so f is a model. [] 
When investigating fixedpoints of functions on posets such as the ones we have, 
the continuity of the function is an important consideration. (A function h : X + X 
is continuous if, for every increasing sequence XoEX~_...Ex, E . . .  in X, 
h(lubx{xi}) =lubx{h(x~)}.) In particular it allows the conclusion that the least 
fixedpoint of the function is computable. The following example shows that r is 
not continuous in general. 
Example 4.2. Take the program P={A~B(x)} with Herbrand base {A, B(0), 
B(S(O)),..., B(S"(O)),...} and let f~ (i =0, 1, 2 , . . . )  be interpretations defined by 
f~(A) = false, f~(B(S"(0))) = if n < i then false else _t_. Then F = lub1{f~} is the inter- 
pretation with F (A)=fa lse ,  F(B(S"(O)))=false (Vn) and so r(F)(A)= F(A)= 
false. On the other hand r( f~)(A)=glbr{true,  false}=_l_ so lub1{r(f~)}(A)= 
lubr{r(f i ) (A)} = ±. Hence we have r(lub1{fi}) ~ lub1{r(fi)}. 
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However r does have the property of monotonicity: i f fE  g, then r ( f )E  r(g). This 
will allow us to apply standard fixedpoint heorems and techniques to r. 
Theorem 4.3. r is monotonic. 
Proof. Let f and g be interpretations, f=g,  and let A e HB. If  (1) holds for f, then 
(1) holds for g (s incefE  g) and r( f )(A) = r(g)(A). I f(2) holds for f, then r( f)(A) = 
glb{true, f(A)}Eglb{true, g(A)]Er(g)(A).  If (3) holds for f, then (3) holds for g 
(since fEg)  and r ( f ) (A)Er(g)(A) .  Hence, r ( f ) (A)Er(g)(A)  (VA~HB),  i.e. 
r(f) E r(g). [] 
As a result of the above theorem, we are assured of the existence of both lfp(r), 
the least fixedpoint of r, and ofp(r),  the optimal fixedpoint of r, [12]. However, we 
cannot use this theorem to conclude that lfp(r) is computable in a manner similar 
to Apt and van Emden's proof [ 1 ] of soundness and completeness of SLD resolution. 
The following proposition shows that the method of computing the least fixedpoint 
when r is continuous will nevertheless apply in this case. Thus lfp(r) is computable. 
Proposition 4.4. l fp(r) = r°'(/2), where /2(A) = l (VA~ HB) and r'°(/2) denotes 
Proof. OE l fp ( r )  and so by induction using the monotonicity of r, r i ( /2)E 
Ifp(r) (Vi~>0). Hence r~'(/2)Elfp(r) .  Also, Vn:r"(/2)Er~(/2) so Vn: r "+ l ( /2 )E  
r(r~'(/2)) and so r° ' ( /2)Er(r '°( .O)) .  Let A~HB.  By construction r ( r ' ( /2 ) ) (A )~ 
false. Suppose r( r °' (/2 ) ) (A) = true, r ~ (/2) (A) ~ true. Then there is a ground instance 
A~B~, . . . ,B ,  of a clause in P such that r~(/2)(Bi)=true(Vi, l~ i~n)  and 
r~'(O)(A) = _L. But then Vi 3 j :  rJ(/2)(B~) = true. Let m be the maximum of these j's, 
Then r=(/2)(Bi) = true (Vi, 1 ~< i ~< n) and so rm+~(O)(A) =true. This is a contradic- 
tion so r '°(O) is a fixedpoint of r and so l fp(r )E  r~(/2). Hence, lfp(r) = r°'(/2). [] 
5. The final semantics 
We have two possible semantics for a logic program provided by our use of 
fixedpoint heory as a tool, the optimal and the least fixedpoints. However as we 
are dealing with logic formulae, we can also consider as possible semantics two 
interpretations derived from strong and weak versions of logical consequence. 
One possibility is to take the interpretation M defned as follows: 
~M(A) = true iff A is true under all models of P, 
~M(A) = false iff A is false under all models of P, 
~ (A) = _L otherwise. 
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This defnition demands unanimity of all models for the true/false value of each 
atom, and if this is not obtained then the undefined truth value ± is assigned. A 
second possibility is to require only that there not be a true/false conflict between 
the truth values given to an atom by two different models, if the atom is to be given 
a true/false value. Thus the second possible choice is the interpretation M defined 
as follows: 
~'M(A) =true iff A is not false under any model of P and is true under 
some model of P, 
~'M(A) = false iff A is not true under any model of P and is false under 
some model of P, 
~(A)  = i otherwise, i.e. A is ± under all models of P or A is true under 
some model of P and false under another. 
These two interpretations are, respectively, the least fixedpoint and the optimal 
fixedpoint. Indeed the first model M takes the truth value of each atom A to be 
the greatest lower bound of the set of truth values A receives in the models. So ~'~ 
is the greatest lower bound of all models. Since the models and the fixedpoints are 
identical, this model is the least fixedpoint of ~'. 
The second model assigns to each atom A a truth value which is consistent with 
the true/false values it receives in other models. Furthermore it chooses the greatest 
consistent value. Thus it is the greatest model which is consistent with every model. 
Recalling once again the identity of the models and the fixedpoints, we can see that 
this model is the greatest fxp-consistent fixedpoint of ~', viz. the optimal fixedpoint 
of 7. Thus, whichever framework we work inmthat of models or that of fixedpoints-- 
we arrive at the same two alternatives. 
The following theorem shows that this choice of alternatives is il lusory--for 
definite clause programs the two fixedpoints, and hence the two models, are identical. 
As a result, the fixedpoint-model which we take as the semantics of P combines 
the advantages of the least and optimal fixedpoints--it embodies all the information 
contained in the recursive definition and it is still computable. In this sense it is 
possible to claim that logic programs provide a good formal ismnit  is possible to 
extract every piece of information from their recursive definitions in a computable 
way. 
Theorem 5.1. ofp(~') = lfp(~'). 
Proof. Let f=  lfp(~') and t(A) = true ('CA e HB). t is also a fixedpoint of ~" so f _  t 
and so VA ~ HB: f (A)  ~ false. Define f '  by 
~true if f (A) = true, 
f ' (A)  = [false otherwise. 
Clearly, fm_f'. Let A e HB. I f  (1) holds for f, then (1) holds forf ' .  So ¢(f') (A) = true = 
f ' (A) .  If (2) or (3) holds for f, then (3) holds for f ' .  So ~-(f ' ) (A)=f'(A).  Hence, 
~'(f')(A) =f'(A) (VA ~ HB), i.e. f '  is a fixedpoint of r. Clearly f=  glb{t,f'}. Since t 
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and f '  are both total functions, they are maximal fixedpoints of r, i.e. t, f '  ~ MAX(z). 
lfp(,)=f~ofp(z)=_glb{g:g~MAX(r)}=_glb{t,f'}=f Hence, o p(~')=Ifp(r).  [] 
Van Emden and Kowalski [3] have given the semantics of logic programs using 
the function T. For a given program P, 
T(J) = {A: there is a ground instance B *- C1, • . . ,  (7, of a clause in P such 
that A=B and {C~, . . . ,  C,}c_J}. 
The following theorem demonstrates that the semantics we give to logic programs 
is equivalent o the semantics of Van Emden and Kowalski. 
Theorem 5.2. ~'°'(12)(A)=true/ffA~ T°(fl) (VA~ HB). 
Proof. Let A~HB.  We prove by induction that r " (Q) (A)=true  iff As T"(O) 
(VA ~ HB, Vn I> 0) and the result follows, r ° (~) (A)  = D(A) = ± and T°(0) = 0. A 
T'+l(fl) iff there is a ground instance A<--BI,..., Bk of a clause in P such that 
{B1, . . . ,  Bk} ~ T"(0) iff there is a ground instance A<--Bb..., Bk of a clause in P 
such that 7"(~)(Bi)  =true (Vi, 1 ~< i~ < k) (induction hypothesis) iff ,"+1(D)(A) = 
true (since, by construction, only case (1) can made A true). [] 
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